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Faculty of Political Science
National University of Political Studies and Public Administration

**Proceedings of
the 6th ACADEMOS Conference 2019**

Political and Economic Unrest in the Contemporary Era

**Editor
Andrei Taranu PhD**

(Bucharest, Romania, 20-23 June 2019)



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International Political Science Conference

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The European Union in Political Thought and Practice of the Ruling Right Wing in Poland (2015-2019)

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Abstract

In this article I present the views of the right wing ruling in Poland since 2015 on issues related to European integration and the European Union. I pay special attention to the largest party of so-called *Zjednoczona Prawica (United Right)*, that is Jarosław Kaczyński's political group *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice)*, its programme and actions and statements of party politicians. The analysis of the programme, declarations and actions of party politicians allows us to notice Eurosceptic tendencies that are the expression of so-called realism in international relations. The theory that perceives nation states as the most important actors of international politics reduces the importance of such entities as the European Union.

The PiS looks at the EU through the prism of national interests and *raison d'état*. The EU's value has been reduced to its usefulness in advancing these interests. For the sake of comparison, I also refer to the programme of a smaller coalition party, *Porozumienie (Agreement)* of Deputy Prime Minister Jarosław Gowin, who defines this formation as pro-EU. However, it is a marginal group without influence on the shape of European policy of the *United Right*.

Keywords: Poland, political thought, Law and Justice

Introduction

As a result of a victory in the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2015, so-called *Zjednoczona Prawica (United Right)*, composed of *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice)*, hereinafter I use the Polish acronym PiS) and two smaller parties, i.e., *Solidarna Polska (Solidarity Poland)* and *Polska Razem (Poland Together)*, took over power in Poland. (In 2017, as a result of merger with smaller organizations the party adopted the name *Porozumienie Jarosława Gowina (Jarosław Gowin's Agreement)*.) The change of power has significantly contributed to the change of Polish foreign policy, including so-called European policy. A symptomatic example of this change was the disappearance of the European Union flags from official conferences and speeches of the Polish Prime Minister and government.

However, more important than the symbols are specific decisions and actions taken in the sphere of internal and foreign policy, which have fundamentally changed the attitude of Poland to the European Union, as well as the perception of Poland in the European Union. I find the reasons for such actions, one of the most serious consequences of which is Poland's alienation in the EU, in ideological and programme assumptions of the right-wing parties, which I would like to discuss in this paper.

Discovering the sense of Polish policy towards the EU in the last four years, I will first of all reach for the analysis of political party programmes (PiS, *Porozumienie*). I will also refer to public speeches and declarations of leading right-wing politicians and their experts.

Although, of course, due to the short form of this paper, I will not make detailed analyses of the statements of individual politicians, I will only mention some as an exemplification. I will also take into consideration political decisions and activities that often reveal true, and not only declared, intentions of political decision-makers, and thus also constitute a source material in research devoted to political thought, which is used by political scientists and historians [1]. In the final part of the paper I will also refer to the normative theory of international relations to present the essence of views of the governing Polish right wing on issues related to the European Union, European or more precisely the EU system of values and generally Polish foreign policy in the context of debates held between so-called realists and cosmopolitans perceived as idealists.

The European Union in political programmes of the Polish right

I would like to start my reflections on the perception of the EU by the right parties ruling in Poland from the analysis of programme documents of two entities forming the right-wing coalition of the *United Right*, i.e., PiS and *Porozumienie*. Programmes signed by political parties are the most valuable and reliable source material for researchers of political visions.

They present both the assessment of the existing social order and project visions of its changes. In democratic societies, political parties have the necessary potential to implement social and political ideas. In favourable circumstances, parties are able to put their programmes into practice [2]. The programmes of mainstream political entities are usually, although it is not a rule of course, well-thought-out and elaborated documents, in which accidental and ill-conceived statements are avoided, which is characteristic of spontaneous statements of politicians. They are also, in a sense, an expression of a collective declaration for which the party takes responsibility. In the case of the PiS, I will refer to the electoral program of 2014: *Program Prawa i Sprawiedliwości* [*The Program of Law and Justice*].

Whereas the party *Porozumienie* announced in January 2019 a political programme entitled *#Energia Miast* [*#Energy of Cities*].

The analysis of the content of the programme documents of both allied parties in relation to European issues immediately leads to the observation that we are dealing with two fairly opposing narratives: (1) the Eurosceptic narrative of the PiS, in which the nation-state and its interests are the supreme value; and (2) the pro-European narrative of *Porozumienie*, in which the EU crisis is mentioned, its immanent sources found in the Union itself are also pointed to, but first and foremost its positive significance for Poland and Europe is emphasised.

The Euroscepticism of the PiS results mainly from placing the declared axiological system on the foundations of so-called realism in international relations. This is evidenced by a clear declaration, which we find in the programme of the party of 2014, that the prime value is the Polish state [*Program PiS*, p. 11]. Therefore, the PiS rejects any form of tightening of European integration detached from the idea of Europe of homelands, and first of all a federalist project [3]. In the PiS programme, it is sensibly noted that entities forming a federation cease to be states from the legal international point of view, transferring their external sovereignty to the federal authority. At the same time, however, party politicians reduce the importance of the EU as an international organisation. They do not even use the category of “union of states” in relation to it, which certainly would better reflect its nature than calling the EU an “international organisation”. Attempts to deepen integration processes are called “European illusions” [3, p. 158].

Paradoxically, however, the architects of the PiS programme seem to notice that the EU is something more than an international organisation. They talk about it in the context of the division, which they adamantly oppose, of the EU into the so-called Eurozone and countries using their own currencies. They believe that “the disintegration of the European Union along

the lines of the division into the Eurozone and other states undermines four foundations of European integration, that is, the assumptions that the Member States share common law, joint institutions, the common market and the common budget, and the states in the Union are guided by the principle of loyal cooperation and mutual openness. We strongly advocate saving these basic dimensions of community in Europe. That is why we want the Union to return to its roots” [*Program PiS*, p. 11.]. They state that the most important achievements of the EU are: (1) the common market; (2) freedom of movement of persons, goods, capital and services; (3) freedom and equality; (4) common rights and common obligations. And within the structure created by these achievements, the following coexistence principles: solidarity and subsidiarity, which “guarantee that each state retains its subjectivity and its own development model consistent with its national interests” [*Program PiS*, p. 11]. The PiS programme does not explain how they understand the individual achievements and principles.

Only subsidiarity was included in the ‘realistic’ narrative, which is characteristic of the party, and reduced to the right of the nation state to its own vision of development and its implementation. The PiS programme does not refer to other values promoted by the EU, such as human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minority groups, or the rule of law [4].

The depreciation of the EU has also a legislative dimension in the PiS programme declaration, which is to be achieved by the act on the exercise of state sovereignty, which strengthens, in the opinion of its originators, the control of the national state authorities over integration processes. In fact, the aim of the act would be to confirm the supremacy of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland over the EU law and the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union, to make the principles of the transfer of competence to EU institutions more precise, to preserve the subjectivity of Polish state authorities towards public finances and taxes, to limit the competences transferred to EU structures, and to introduce the principle of balance between the transferred competences and the control of the institutions of the Polish state over their performance by EU institutions [*Program PiS*, pp. 150-151].

The limitation of the possibility of interference by EU institutions in the internal affairs of Poland and the lowering of the significance of CJEU rulings take on a new meaning in the context of changes in the Polish judicial system initiated by the ruling right. There is no room for a full presentation of this topic. However, it is important from the point of view of how the PiS perceives both the EU and its system of values which assumes attachment to the rule of law and independence of the judicial system. In my opinion, PiS politicians already at the stage of formulating the political programme in 2014 assumed the possibility of a conflict with EU institutions in this respect and possible unfavourable adjudications of the CJEU concerning the reforms of the judiciary in Poland only planned at that time. The current actions of the right-wing government only confirm the thesis about the instrumental treatment the EU and the deprecation of its subjectivity as a political community based on a catalogue of values such as the rule of law, democracy and justice. The narrowly understood national interest becomes for the PiS a guiding principle of conduct in international relations. The EU value is measured by its usefulness for the pursuance of the national interest. The PiS programme says it directly: “Membership of international organisations such as the European Union or the North Atlantic Alliance should be treated as a tool for the pursuance of Polish national interests and the creation of an international environment favourable for us in cooperation with other countries, and not as an end in itself and the end of Polish subjectivity” [*Program PiS*, p. 150]. In another fragment of the quoted document, the PiS expresses its attitude to the EU even more clearly: “We look at the European Union through Polish interests” [*Program PiS*, p. 158]. That is why the PiS expresses its opposition to treating Polish foreign policy as an element of the EU’s external policy, reducing the EU’s interest to the interests of the strongest Member States. The authors of the party’s programme most

probably mean France and Germany, although they do not express it directly. Their assumption – quite controversial considering the interdependences in the globalised world – is that Poland is able to effectively carry out independent foreign policy and influence the shape of international politics. The only motive of Polish foreign policy is to be the national interest and the Polish *raison d'état*, [*Program PiS*, p. 154], which of course is inconsistent with the idea of normative power that the EU with its programmes of promoting European and humanitarian values is, or at least tries to be [5].

The issue of security is the leading aspect of European and transatlantic policy in the PiS programme. Also, at this point, party politicians emphasise the importance of the state's sovereignty. Although they support the creation of 'ambitious' EU security policy, they reject the concept of a formalised and hierarchical EU military structure, as well as the initiation of military cooperation competitive with NATO. They indicate the USA as the most important Polish military ally [*Program PiS*, pp. 153-154]. In order to strengthen Poland's position in European structures, the PiS outlines a project of regional cooperation of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. It means in fact pushing Poland away from the decision-making core in the EU, marginalisation of cooperation within the so-called Weimar Triangle (Poland – Germany – France) and an attempt to build an alternative coalition of states with similar historical experiences and strong authoritarian and populist tendencies in society, which has become the actual doctrine of Polish foreign policy after the PiS assumed power in the state in 2015.

That is why they declare their support for EU enlargement to the East as far as the Caucasus. And although the name of the state is not mentioned in the party's programme, it certainly pertains to Georgia. PiS politicians call it "keeping the door to the European Union open" [*Program PiS*, p. 155]. Such a vision of the EU, on the one hand, enfeebles the processes that strengthen integration (federalisation process), on the other hand, it enables building an alternative alliance that is supposed to guarantee the pursuit of national interests.

Speaking about the need for the EU to open up to Eastern Europe, the PiS criticises the Eastern Partnership project co-created by the Polish government of Donald Tusk [*Program PiS*, p. 155].

Using sarcasm, PiS politicians in their programme proclaim the need to "turn the Union right side up". They do not see an improvement in the functioning of the EU in the deepening of integration, which they perceive as the centralisation of power, but in, how they put it, increasing "freedom and solidarity", without specifying what freedom and solidarity they mean [*Program PiS*, p. 158].

They treat their proposals for EU reforms rather vaguely and in terms of slogans. Such terms as already mentioned freedom or solidarity appear here but certain concepts are not elaborated on. However, a hermeneutic approach in the analysis of the PiS party programme and a juxtaposition of programme postulates with PiS politicians' statements and Poland's European policy implemented by this party will undoubtedly reveal the true meaning of generally defined slogans and goals, which I will refer to later in the paper. At this point, I would like to present the programme of Jarosław Gowin's party *Porozumienie* in which we encounter slightly different rhetoric.

The volume of the programme document is much more modest than that of the PiS programme, however quite a lot of space is devoted to European themes. The first impression in comparison with the analogous PiS document is a change in rhetoric. The language is gentler, the EU is not treated as a foreign body threatening state sovereignty, but as a natural development space for Poland: 'The EU is us!'. We do not notice here a hostile attitude towards the European bureaucracy. The authors of the programme of *Porozumienie* directly express their attachment to the idea of integration and the EU: 'We stand for the EU because the divided EU means weaker Europe and there is no alternative to European structures'.

The document talks about the effectiveness of European institutions, but at the same time party politicians mention the strengthening of Poland's position in the EU structures, the principle of subsidiarity which alleviates the tension between the Member States' implementation of their own *raison d'état* and loyal fulfilment of obligations resulting from EU membership, as well as the necessity to stop the alienation of the European elites in relation to, as they put it, 'social base'. *Porozumienie* also draws attention to the crisis in the EU. Nevertheless, it treats the EU, at least in the declarative sphere, in a subjective way.

Therefore, the crisis in the EU is not treated as a crisis in a foreign environment: 'The crisis of Europe is also our crisis'. Completely contrary to the programme and speeches of PiS politicians, *Porozumienie's* programme postulates not to indulge in criticism and peer review, but to focus on finding solutions that will overcome the current crisis of European integration in the conditions of global uncertainty.

In contrast to the PiS programme, *Porozumienie* does not opt for building an alliance of the Central and East European countries, alternative to the EU's core countries. Instead, we find there a declaration of cooperation with France and Germany in key issues for the EU. In reforming the EU's institutions and decision-making processes, the party pays special attention to empowering EU citizens and democratising the decision-making system and legislation. Hence, there are proposals to strengthen the role of national parliaments as bodies elected in a democratic manner and to introduce the principle of transparency in negotiations between EU institutions. Thanks to this, according to the authors of *Porozumienie's* programme, the activities of EU institutions will become more visible to ordinary citizens, and the EU will cease to be perceived as a foreign body, which will also take away arguments from various types of populists and radicals.

The ruling right (2015-2019) towards the European Union

The analysis of programmes of both parties composing the *United Right* leads to the conclusion that the attitude of the ruling right to the European Union is equivocal. While the PiS represents Eurosceptic positions, or Euro-realistic ones, as they are defined by the politicians of this faction and its experts, Jarosław Gowin's party *Porozumienie* is a faction that associates more pro-EU politicians. This tactical and largely strategic alliance of both right-wing parties brings benefits in the form of increasing the social base of the right-wing coalition. Both programmes are addressed to various electorates: conservative-nationalist and peasant-Catholic (PiS) as well as conservative-liberal (*Porozumienie*). However, the relations between the two parties are not symmetrical. The dominance of the PiS is evident. Suffice it to say that the members and sympathisers of *Porozumienie* include only a dozen or so deputies and senators in the Parliamentary Club consisting of 237 deputies and over 60 senators. Therefore, the period of right-wing governments in Poland is rather the time of implementation the PiS programme visions and proposals rather than of the pro-EU attitude of Jarosław Gowin's both parties – *Polska Razem*, and currently *Porozumienie*.

Almost four years of the reign of the *United Right* are mainly characterised by tensions in relations with the EU. At the very beginning after Beata Szydło's government was formed, the EU's flags were removed from the Polish prime minister's official conferences and addresses – a symbolic gesture. This symbolic gesture could be interpreted as a forecast for the development of relations between the Polish government and the EU, which began to be treated by the ruling party as a foreign body threatening Polish sovereignty and *raison d'état*.

It was a procedure essentially revealing populist tendencies in the PiS. European elites and the pro-European opposition were in practice defined as enemies of systemic changes in Poland (so-called reforms of the Constitutional Tribunal and the judiciary), wanting to impose on Poland social and cultural solutions contrary to its tradition (gender ideology, same-sex

marriages, secularisation of society), limit its sovereignty, and also threaten the security of Poland by relocating refugees and immigrants [6]. The consequence of the strategy adopted by the most important party decision makers was the creation of an increasingly negative picture of the EU, especially the European Commission, the Christian Democratic and Social Democratic faction in the European Parliament, also personally of Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, as well as of France and Germany. The confrontation reaction of the PiS decision makers intensified in situations when the EU institutions decided to take certain actions interpreted by the PiS as aimed against Poland, such as the initiation of the rule of law framework by the European Commission in connection with the unconstitutional actions of the PiS governments against the Constitutional Tribunal and debates of the European Parliament devoted to the issue of violation of the rule of law by the Polish authorities [7].

As previously mentioned, the PiS electoral programme of 2014 implicitly assumed this type of confrontation. Therefore, the depreciation of the importance of European institutions and law was already visible there. They were to threaten the sovereignty of the state, which in practice was reduced to the arbitrariness of executive and legislative bodies in interpreting constitutional norms and principles (a dispute with the Constitutional Tribunal to take over full control over it at the turn of 2016 and 2017), giving them an unwarranted influence on the judiciary, which must be interpreted as a breach of the fundamental principles of the EU Member States, in this case the rule of law. Thus, if some external entity or institution threatens the implementation of such defined sovereign interests of the state it must become an opponent of this state. And it does not become an opponent of the authority, which it suspects of breaking the rules, but of the state itself, and that is how it was expressed in the narrative of the PiS and its allies. Although prominent PiS politicians, including the president of the party Jarosław Kaczyński, former prime minister Beata Szydło and current prime minister Mateusz Morawiecki, declare that the PiS does not intend to lead Poland out of the EU, it does not aim at so-called Polesxit. During one of his public speeches, Jarosław Kaczyński declared that: “We do not see the place of Poland, anywhere else but in the European Union” [<https://www.tvp.info/39546456/jaroslaw-kaczynski-my-nie-widzimy-miejsca-polski-gdzie-indziej-niz-w-unii-europejskiej>, 2019-03-30]. However, behind these declarations, there is no understanding, not only for the activities of EU institutions towards Poland, but also of the EU as a political and axiological community. In the PiS narrative the activities of the European Commission or the CJEU are to be inspired by the previous elites, which strive to maintain the *status quo*. Kaczyński expresses this directly in one of the interviews: “we expressed the fear that the elites elected after 1989 may want to treat the presence in the European Union as a guarantee of maintaining their influence [...] Today, it is clear that this diagnosis was one hundred percent correct. Unfortunately,” [<https://www.rp.pl/Unia-Europejska/180709812-Jaroslaw-Kaczynski-o-funduszach-UE-Nikt-niczego-nie-bedzie-zamrazal.html>, 2019-03-30]. Thus, we have here insinuations typical of populist movements: (a) conspiracy of old elites (in the case of Poland formed in 1989 as a result of an agreement between communists and part of the opposition), (b) their use of external factors (the EU; politicians of the Civic Platform have been accused in Poland of informing on their own state), (c) interference of these factors in internal affairs (the Rule of Law Framework of the European Commission, a debate in the European Parliament, a possible ruling of the CJEU), (d) resistance to the external factor as defence of sovereignty and subjectivity (identifying the criticism of the authority’s activities with attacking Poland) [8].

This subjectivity is understood in a rather anachronistic way as the omnipotence of a nation state whose interest becomes the guiding principle of its operation. Hence, Poland’s membership of the EU is usually associated with a particularly understood national interest, largely based on the economic calculation of profits and losses. Therefore, despite the pro-EU

declarations of key politicians of the PiS or more generally the *United Right*, so-called Polesit is the subject of considerations at least in the internal party debate. It is obviously neither an official position of the party, nor does it appear in the speeches of the leading right-wing politicians, because Polish society is characterised by a high degree of support for European integration and Polish membership of the EU, which is why right-wing politicians avoid this topic. However, on the internal forum one can encounter opinions of politicians or party experts, such as that of Zdzisław Krasnądębski, the deputy to the European Parliament, who during the 2015 Programme Convention expressed the view that Poland must be ready for various long-term scenarios, including “finding itself outside the Union, and even building a different, own supranational structure”. He also argues that the centralisation of the EU – that is strengthening of the competences of European institutions – would be more dangerous than its disintegration [*Myśląc Polska. Konwencja Programowa*, Katowice, 2015, p. 81].

Euro-realism or Euroscepticism?

As I signalled at the beginning, both in its diagnoses and declarations, especially those related to the party programme, and in the speeches and analyses of leading politicians and party experts, the PiS refers to the theory of realism in international relations. The theory of international relations is connected with the activity of specific actors of these relations, especially states of course, creating international reality, as indicated by Torbjørn L. Knutsen who in his excellent textbook *A History of International Relations Theory* notes that “theories are always shaped by the events of their times” [9]. It must be acknowledged that the party, thanks to expert help, created a fairly coherent programme, though not entirely consistent in its realistic orientation, in which it outlined the image of Poland on the international arena and its role in the EU. The authors of the programme used categories of realistic school, such as *raison d'état* or national interest. Therefore, it is not surprising that the EU is treated only as an international organisation, which is useful as much as it helps in the pursuit of Polish interests. Another issue is whether we agree with the vision presented in the PiS programme or not. However, it must be clearly stated that the party's view on the sphere of international relations is a reference to so-called realists. This is how Polish political scientists define the PiS position. Waldemar Paruch, who is not only a researcher, but also an expert of PiS, draws attention to the correlation between the PiS's attitude towards the EU, which he defines as Euro-realism, and political and international realism. In this sense, international relations are a sphere of competition and conflicts, and the only serious subjects of these relations are states that advance their interests in alliance or confrontation with other states. International organisations, such as NATO or the EU – regarded by the PiS as one of them, are only an instrument in state policy, aimed at fortifying its subjectivity and pursuing its interests [10].

In turn, according to Artur Staszczyk, the PiS programme fits into the discourse between proponents of the concept of intergovernmentalism and transnationality in the process of European integration. The first theory, represented by the PiS, is derived from realistic theory in international relations. The EU is treated in it as an anarchist international environment where nation states are the leading actors. Integration is the result of negotiations between states; it does not diminish their role or limit subjectivity, but on the contrary strengthens their position. National interest is the most important factor determining their functioning within the framework of integration processes. Therefore, states oppose the deprivation of competencies that are essential for their sovereignty, such as foreign or defence policy. This is an intellectual attitude close to political thinking of the PiS. Staszczyk rightly notes also that the EU is treated by this party as an international organisation and not as a supranational community, as it is perceived by representatives of the other theoretical orientation [11].

What Paruch and PiS politicians call Euro-realism, however, I would call Euroscepticism.

At the end of the 1970s Charles Beitz talked about the scepticism of realists [12]. Realism is essentially an approach that would be better defined by the category of scepticism. Those who are often defined quite disrespectfully as idealists (cosmopolitans and liberals), and in fact are moralists for whom the nation state and its *raison d'état* cannot be above universal norms and values, are no less realistic in seeing international reality than those who were generously called realists, as if moral pessimism was a sufficient reason to take away a realistic sense from those who see the need to introduce moral norms and order in international politics, and to give it to those who ignore universal moral norms. Euro-realism is rather a veiled form of Euroscepticism. PiS's absolutisation of national sovereignty, the declared faith of the party politicians in the supremacy of *raison d'état* and the national interest, while denying universalist projects in the form of the more integrated EU, which is supposed to be something like a federation of nation states, and not just a loose union of states, and finally the deprecation of European law and European values and principles, make PiS essentially a Eurosceptic party.

Euroscepticism itself can have various faces. Søren Riishøj speaks of nine types of this attitude towards integration processes in Europe [13]:

- *Identity-based Euroscepticism,*
- *Cleavage-based Euroscepticism,*
- *Policy-based scepticism, or “functional Euro-realism”,*
- *Institutionally based scepticism,*
- *National interest-based scepticism,*
- *Experience-based scepticism,*
- *Party-based Euroscepticism,*
- *Atlantic-based scepticism,*
- *a practice-based Euroscepticism.*

There is no room here to discuss all these types in detail. However, even a glimpse at their definitions makes it possible to note the convergence of some of them with the PiS programme and declarations. In the case of this party we encounter *identity-based Euroscepticism*. Especially in recent years, national rhetoric has intensified among the politicians of the right, while depreciating the cosmopolitan European community. President Andrzej Duda bluntly put it when he described the EU as an imaginary community from which we don't gain much [<https://bit.ly/2WnTpVp>, 2019-04-01]. (This is not about substantive issues. Because every national community is an imaginary community, which the President of Poland did not seem to know, and about which Stanisław Ossowski, one of the first classics of Polish sociology, wrote. Intention is more important here. This 'imagined community' was in fact to depreciate the value of the EU.) These words were said in a context that infixes the narrative of the PiS and the President coming this formation in other forms of Euroscepticism, i.e., *institutionally based scepticism* and *national interest-based scepticism*. In the first case, we refer to the opposition of national institutions to EU institutions, e.g., the CJEU and its verdicts on national legislation and judgments of the Polish Constitutional Court, especially after its politicisation by the PiS. In the second case, the purpose is to highlight the contradiction between the national interest and common EU goals, while primacy is given to the former [13]. In contrast to pro-EU parties, such as the Civic Platform, the PiS does not link national interests with the community interest. For the aforementioned pro-EU party, the national interest is intrinsically linked to the pan-European interest [*Następny krok. Razem. Program wyborczy 2011. Platforma Obywatelska*, p. 88], while both the PiS programme and the statements of the party's politicians deny it.

Conclusion

Although the so-called *United Right*, ruling in Poland since 2015, does not present a monolithic programme with regard to the vision of European integration, the role of Poland in Europe or the future of the EU, its main party – the PiS may be defined as a Eurosceptic faction. The Euroscepticism strategy is consciously created, consistent and quite coherent.

And despite the fact that in the statements and declarations of politicians, this Euroscepticism is close to populism directed against the European elites, which also happens to the most important party politicians, including President Duda, this Euroscepticism is reasonably well justified in the party programme. It is not limited to anti-EU slogans; the party's programme is strongly embedded in the theory of realism in international relations, which sees nation states as the basic subjects of international politics. The PiS acts as if it was a party which “keeps its feet on the ground”. However, a serious doubt arises whether what is presented as realism in self-presentation is exactly this in reality? Is this so-called realism, or rather scepticism and its European variant, i.e. Euroscepticism, not reactive to civilisation changes, which inevitably change the face of the modern world? It may be worthwhile to reach for some of the forgotten theories of civilizational development, which were very popular in the 1990s and at the beginning of the 21st century. As Benjamin Barber argued, the western world had become an arena of a clash between metaphorical *Jihad* and *MacWorld*. *Jihad* means not just Islamic militants, but as a metaphor it refers to all advocates of ancient regime, including omnipotent nation states jealously guarding their sovereignty, while *MacWorld* is a synonym for the progress of post-industrial or post-modern civilisation, in which new forms of political organisation also appear [14]. In my opinion, the European Union can be treated as the avant-garde of post-modernity, which now transcends the conceptual framework of political science and laws shaped in the modern era [15]. The PiS will appear in this light as a party defending the international status quo. There is another doubt here whether the realistic tradition born at the threshold of modernity is not too much of a burden that impedes seeing the real world in the second decade of the 21st century? Juggling with realistic categories, such as national interest, *raison d'état*, power, disregarding the supranational entity, which the EU really is, and the rather modest potential of Poland, may turn out to be deceptive and bring about effects that are different from the intended ones, which so-called realists do not seem to notice.

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